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The second part in a two-part series on the Savannah River Site

By Michael Hopping

In 2002 and 2003 the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken took in several metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium from the now defunct Rocky Flats facility in Colorado. Now, a new plutonium shipping campaign is underway to consolidate the nation’s supply of “non-pit” (never weaponized) plutonium at SRS. When shipments are completed in 2010, the K-Area Materials Site (KAMS) will house approximately 13 tons of the stuff.

The first installment of this story discussed shipping routes and some transport hazards related to the packaging system chosen to move and store the plutonium. The “9975 package” is a 35-gallon stainless steel drum internally padded with Celotex fiberboard. Inside, up to approximately 9 1/2 lbs. of plutonium is contained by a nested pair of sealed stainless steel cylinders and a ½ inch lead jacket.

The 9975 package was certified to withstand Type B accident resistance tests in 1999. Required tests included a 30-ft drop and exposure to a fire burning at 1475° F for 30 minutes. Later, it was discovered that the lid popped open like Popeye’s can of spinach when the package was dropped at an angle on its lid. The embarrassing flaw necessitated a lid redesign but not retesting of the package, according to DOE officials at SRS.

Long-term storage

Concerns more relevant to long-term plutonium storage in 9975s have also surfaced in official reports. In hot humid conditions, such as a South Carolina nuclear reactor turned warehouse such as KAMS, Celotex becomes brittle and begins to crack, losing its protective properties. Celotex deterioration and the eventual failure of the gas seal O-rings in the inner containment vessel led federal officials to guesstimate the safe lifespan of a loaded 9975 package at 10-12 years.

Also, plutonium absorbs water vapor and breaks it down to hydrogen and oxygen. The oxygen reacts with plutonium metal to form plutonium oxide, but hydrogen remains as a free gas. In any sealed can system, including the 9975, hydrogen levels rise, potentially posing a risk of fire or explosion. This prospect is reduced by baking water out of plutonium before it is packed. The air in the inner containment vessel may also be partly replaced with non-combustible helium or nitrogen gas.

Allen Gunner, who manages the 9975 package program at SRS, says he and his staff instituted an ongoing surveillance program to address these issues in 2007. (KAMS already houses 2,800 plutonium-filled 9975s from Rocky Flats.) In Gunner’s initial sample of seven containers, hydrogen levels were within the expected range. He found no bad welds. Some deformation of gas seal O-rings had occurred, but none of the packages had leaked. Gunner reports, “Based on what we’re seeing today, there’s no degradation of the Celotex.”

The surveillance imperative

Fire hazards are one reason for careful monitoring of the 9975s stored at KAMS. Even before mass quantities of Rocky Flats plutonium arrived in 2002-2003, a Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) report complained of electrical hazards and combustible materials in the room. It judged KAMS fire detection and response systems inadequate.

As of late 2007, five years later, fire upgrades in KAMS proper have been completed, says DOE spokesman James Giusti. But another DNFSB report suggests work on associated fire systems may still be in process.

There is a second overarching cause for diligence in tending a 50-year-old warehouse stacked high with drums of plutonium. Nobody knows how long the stuff will be there. South Carolinians may remember former governor Jim Hodges’ unsuccessful attempt to block the Rocky Flats plutonium shipments in 2002. At the time, DOE plans called for relatively short-term storage at KAMS. The plutonium was to be converted either to a new type of power plant fuel rod called MOX or prepared for entombment out-of-state.

Perhaps in deference to those who agreed with Hodges, the Defense Authorization Act of 2003 promised to suspend plutonium shipments and remove defense plutonium from South Carolina if a MOX fuel factory at SRS isn’t ready to produce fuel by 2009. If MOX production objectives are still not achieved as of January 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense would be obligated to pay the state fines of $1 million per day, not to exceed $100 million per year, until production objectives are achieved, the plutonium is removed, or the year 2016.

Timetables have slipped. Construction on the MOX facility didn’t begin until August 2007. Barring more delays, fuel production may begin in 2016 and continue through 2038.

The Aiken Chamber of Commerce, ordinarily a booster of all things nuclear, hasn’t been pleased. In 2006, it asked DOE to live up to its promise and suspend new plutonium shipments. The new plutonium campaign would appear to be part of the federal answer. (Current whereabouts and shipping plans for an additional 38 tons of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and also supposedly destined for conversion to MOX fuel are unclear.)

What about the promised state budgetary windfall in 2011? Don’t hold your breath. Defense Authorization Act timelines have been repeatedly revised to accommodate lack of progress on the MOX plant. And, in case a sleepy bureaucrat forgets to change the law to reflect future delays, a 2005 revision of the law alters the source for the $1 million/day penalty money. It will no longer come from “funds available to the Secretary.” Instead it will be “subject to the availability of appropriations.’’

South Carolina won’t see a penny.

Given the often lackadaisical record of federal bureaucratic and budgetary performance, it appears unlikely that the plutonium will be moved out of South Carolina anytime soon either. DOE’s announcement of the new plutonium shipments says storage may be necessary for up to 50 years. That’s four or five times the expected lifespan of a 9975 package. Here’s hoping future DOE budgets see fit to keep Gunner, his surveillance crew, and their descendents on the job at KAMS.